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Engel’s Law states that food’s budget share is inversely related to household real income.  As
Houthakker (1987) states, “Of all empirical regularities observed in economic data, Engel’s law is probably
the best established….(but) like most economic laws, it holds only ceteris paribus; prices, among other
things, are assumed constant.”  Algebraically,
Equation 1
å += iif Xpyg q w )/(
where wf is food’s budget share, y/p is nominal income deflated by a cost of living deflator, the Xi’s are the
ceteris to be held paribus, and the qi’s are their coefficients.
With a micro cross-section/time-series data set such as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, it is
relatively straightforward to observe or estimate everything in equation 1 except the cost of living deflator
p.  My strategy is to track temporal movement in the true cost-of-living deflator, p, by observing wf, y and
the vector of X’s, estimating the parameters, and solving for the implied time path of p.
As Nakamura (1996) has noted in his controversial critique of the CPI, food’s budget share declined
throughout the “stagnant” 1970s, suggesting that income growth was more robust during the ‘70s than
suggested by the CPI figures.    I find that food’s budget share has declined far too much since 1974 to be
explained by CPI-deflated income growth, or by any other regressors.
In spirit, this approach is similar to that of Nordhaus (1996), who in effect created a  CPI adjusted
to make real income growth consistent with consumers’ perceptions of their financial well-being.  Nordhaus
measures consumers’ perceptions of their well-being by taking the difference between those who report
themselves “better off than last  year” and those who report themselves “worse off” in the University of
Michigan Survey Research Center’s survey of consumer behavior.
My approach offers several advantages relative to Nordhaus.  First, my dependent variable is
continuous rather than the crude trichotomous survey variable (“better off than last year,” “worse off,”2
“about the same”).
2   Second, actions do speak louder than words; under my approach a consumer must put
his money where his mouth is, not just respond to a survey.  Third, as I will show, the Krueger/Siskind
(1998) criticisms of Nordhaus (shifts in the income distribution and life-cycle effects) are very easily
handled.
My approach also has some kinship with the extensive work of Jorgenson and Slesnick (1997),
who estimate a complete system of demand functions, and then use information on prices and the demand-
system coefficients to back out annual costs and standards of living.   They aggregate individual-good
prices into 5 broad-category translog price indices, which constitute the price data for their demand system.
For purposes of estimating CPI bias, the main difficulty with their approach is that they must assume that
the individual-good prices are reported correctly, and that they properly capture the array of available
goods.  Whereas their method elegantly handles substitution bias, it has no way of handling such problems
as new-product bias or unmeasured quality improvement.
Most CPI research takes the brute-force approach of examining the various components of the
index for specific instances of bias, and attempting to determine the magnitude of these biases (see Moulton
(1996), Shapiro and Wilcox (1996), Boskin, Dulberger, Gordon, Griliches and Jorgenson (1996)).   One
problem with this approach is that it is impossible to know when we are “finished;” the most we can ever
say is that we have corrected all of the biases that we have found.  A related problem is that for many
important adjustments it is extremely difficult to quantify the required adjustment; much of the discussion,
even in a study as careful as the Boskin report, takes the form of (highly educated) guesstimates.
To take one example, Gordon (1990) presented extremely careful and painstaking estimates of the
true cost of automobile services and made several important discoveries including evidence of serious bias
in the CPI for used cars.  But even after this careful work he neglected one important component of the cost
of auto services:  the longevity of cars themselves.  The life expectancy of 1960 cars was just over 9 years;
that of 1979 vintages was over 11 years.  Over this timespan both Gordon and the CPI missed a substantial
source of decline in the cost of automobile services.
                                                                                                                                                                            
1 Johns Hopkins University.  I thank Carl Christ, Jennifer Hunt, Robert Moffitt, and Matthew Shapiro for
helpful comments on earlier drafts.
2 See also Krueger and Siskind (1998), who do not find significant bias after applying some refinements to
the Nordhaus approach.3
Another problem with the standard approach is that it is quite difficult to examine the magnitude of
the bias historically; frequently the data required to correct CPI components are available only for the
relatively recent past, so it is difficult to learn how significant the bias has been in the more remote past.
Whatever new problems may be introduced by the Engel-curve method of estimating the cost of
living, it has the virtue of bypassing a host of virtually insurmountable problems.  To get a feel for the
usefulness of food as an indicator of well-being, turn to Figures 1 and 2.  Data for both figures are national
aggregates from the National Income Accounts.
3 Treating food’s share as an indicator for standard of living,
one would conclude that there was a period of stagnation from the late 1960s through the mid-'70‘s, but that
for the 20 years since then real income growth has been about what it was in the prior two decades.
                          Figure 1 Figure 2
Figure 2 shows the components of this ratio.  Per capita food consumption (food expenditure
deflated by the food component of the CPI)
4 rose about 25%, almost linearly, from 1950 through 1972.
After drifting down, then up and then down again, per-capita food consumption in 1992 was back at
                                                          
3 Figure 1 also shows the average value of food’s budget share (at home plus away from home) respectively
for the black and white PSID samples upon which I base my estimation below.  Whereas my estimates are
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approximately its 1972 level, despite a 30% rise in per-capita CPI-deflated DPI from 1972 to 1992 and a
10% decline in the relative CPI of food.
5 Figure 2 appears to be internally inconsistent, and also
inconsistent with figure 1 (which suggests that real income growth after 1975 may have been comparable to
the growth pattern from 1950 to 1970).  Nevertheless, one could imagine a variety of explanations for the
apparent inconsistency between these figures.  It could have been caused by an unmeasured decline in the
relative price of food,
6 the widening of the income distribution, the decline in family size, increasing female
labor force participation or a change in the volatility of income, for example.
The first purpose of this paper is to utilize the PSID to see whether the anomalies  of Figures 1 and
2 can be attributed to some non-CPI cause such as demographics or changes in the distribution of income.
The second purpose is to offer a more refined estimate of CPI bias.  Third, I will present evidence of
strikingly different inflation rates by race.
Using the PSID, I estimate a demand function for food at home
7 for 1974
8  through 1991
9.  Using a
standard measure of real income (total family income after federal taxes, the PSID’s best continuously
available approximation of disposable income)
10 deflated by the CPI, this demand function has shown
consistent drift over the sample period; I attribute this drift to unmeasured growth in real income, and in
turn I attribute the mismeasurement of income to CPI bias.
                                                                                                                                                                            
4 Throughout this paper, when referring to “the CPI,” I will mean the CPI-U and its components.
5 If income and price elasticities are respectively ± 0.5, measured changes in income and prices should have
resulted in approximately a 20% increase in food consumption.
6 I have already accounted for the measured decline, by deflating food expenditure by the food CPI.
7 Food away from home would be interesting as well.  However, in some years it is reported only by fairly
broad band.  And for many consumers it is zero.  Below I discuss the role of food away from home.
8 Inasmuch as the PSID began in 1968, it is unfortunately not possible to extend this technique back to the
early 1960s or the 1950s.  In addition, the food data appear to be fairly erratic from 1968-72 (and not
reported for 1973).  Thus I must begin my analysis in 1974.
9 When I began this research, the last wave of the PSID available in final form was 1992, which reports
1991 income.  Thus 1991 is the last year for which I can calculate my dependent variable, food’s share of
income.  Even as more data become available, it will be difficult to extend this work forward due to a
change in PSID coverage (see footnote 10 below).
10 In the 1992 wave, PSID does not report federal income taxes (for 1991 income).  To estimate federal
taxes for 1991 I regress 1990 taxes on income, income squared, family size and size of home mortgage.  I
then assume that the same relationship (R
2 = .988) explains the relationship between taxes and the other
regressors for 1991, with 1991 income deflated by CPI growth to account for indexing of the tax code.
Unfortunately, this extrapolation becomes progressively worse as it is extended forward in time; thus even
when the data become available it will be difficult to extend this method forward in time.5
In a nutshell, the  results are as follows:  On average, in 1974 the PSID sample
11 of white
households spent 16.64% of its  income on at-home food.  By 1991 this share had fallen to 12.04%.
Measured per-household income grew 7% over this time span, explaining just over half a point of the food
share decline.  Decline in the relative CPI of food is sufficient to explain perhaps as much as 1 percentage
point of decline in food’s share. Other regressors accounts for less than 0.1 point of additional decline; thus
about 3 points of the food-share decline are left to be explained by CPI bias.  I estimate that this bias is
about 2.5% per year from 1974 through 1981, and slightly under 1% per year since then.
For blacks, food’s share fell from 21.17% to 12.44%.  Approximately .8 point of the decline can
be explained by measured income growth, and another  point by movement in other regressors, and up to
another 1 point by the decline in the food CPI.  Thus the food-share decline left to be explained by
measurement error is 5.9 points.  I estimate the bias to be approximately 4%  per year from 1974 through
1981 and about 3% per year since then.
II.   ESTIMATION APPROACH
In this section I describe the empirical method that I will use to estimate CPI bias.  As stated, the
fundamental approach is to infer well-being by observing food’s share.
a.  Why Food?
Food is the only consumption item regularly tracked in the PSID, and the PSID is the only micro
data set with good income data which covers a sufficient time span to properly carry out this exercise.  But
in fact food was a fortuitous choice; it is perhaps the ideal indicator good for inferring inflation.
First, any indicator good must have an income elasticity substantially different from unity;
otherwise the budget share is insensitive to income and thus to mismeasurement of income.
Second, almost unique among consumer goods, food has no durability whatsoever;  food
expenditure is virtually identical to food consumption.  There is no stock/flow issue to confound
measurement of consumption.
                                                          
11 Actually this a subset of the PSID data base, in which I have eliminated some outliers and other
pathological cases.  Below I will discuss the selection criteria.6
Third, food is a pretty straightforward good.  Other candidate indicator goods, such as recreation
(see Costa (1997)), involve tricky definitional problems over and above the issue of durability.  (How, for
example, do we count books?)
Fourth, it is fairly natural to assume, as I will, that food is strongly separable from nonfood in
consumers’ utility functions.  With separability comes the result that CPI bias in such prime suspects as
personal computers will not affect food’s budget share through some peculiar (unmodeled) complementarity
or substitutability, but only through the channels anticipated in the model.
b.  Basic Estimating Structure
I begin with the basic demand structure of Working (1943) and Leser (1963):
Equation 2
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where
wi,j,t Food’s share of family income for person i in SMSA j in year t
Pf,j,t True but unobservable price of food in SMSA j in year t
Pn,j,t True but unobservable price of nonfood in SMSA j in year t
Pj,t True but unobservable general price level in SMSA j in year t
Yi,j,t Consumer i’s nominal income in year t
Xi,j,t Background variable vector for person I in SMSA j in year t
The true cost of living, Pj,t, is a weighted average of the prices of food and nonfood
12:
Equation 3
ln ln ( )ln ,, , , , PP P jt f jt njt =+ - a a 1
Pf , Pn , and P are measured with (CPI-bias) error:
                                                          
12 I take averages of logs, not of absolute levels.  In part this is for algebraic simplicity down the road, but it
is justified in that a cost-of-living index which is a weighted average of logs reflects elasticity of substitution
equal to unity, rather than the zero elasticity of substitution assumed in a fixed-weight index.7
Equation 4
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where
Pg,j,0 Unobservable true price of g (f,n, or _) in SMSA j in year 0
Pg,j,t Cumulative percent increase in the (CPI) measured price of g in SMSA j from year 0 to year t
Eg,t Year-t percent measurement error in cumulative good-g inflation (assumed constant across
SMSA’s)





Throughout the paper, P and p, with appropriate subscripts, refer to true but unobservable prices; Õt and pt
refer to CPI-measured cumulative inflation until year t, and Et and et with appropriate product subscripts,
refer to cumulative CPI error until year t.  Combining,
Equation 5
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Now substitute into equation (2), and collect terms respectively involving e and p0:
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where (6) assumes (as I will) that CPI bias does not vary geographically.  Now suppose we have a cross-
section/time-series database (the PSID) with micro data on income and food expenditure (as well as other
variables such as family composition which would influence food expenditure), as well as cross-section CPI
for all consumption, for food, and for nonfood, over the entire data period for a sample of SMSA’s.
Empirical specification is straightforward:8
Equation 7
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Although pf,j,t and pn,j,t are measured with error, this is not a source of errors-in-variables bias in the
demand coefficients g, b and q.  Each year’s CPI error itself is perfectly correlated with the corresponding
year dummy; thus CPI bias does not bias our estimates of the demand coefficients.
c.  Geographic Price Variation
The relative CPI of food declined about 10% over the sample period; the first term on the right-
hand side of (7) accounts for the effect of this (measured) price decline upon w.  Were we to omit the price
term, that part of the decline in w due to the price decline would be improperly ascribed to CPI bias.  Thus
identification of CPI bias requires inclusion of (pf - pn) and estimation of the price coefficient, g.  But g can
only be estimated if the relative price varies independently of the other regressors.  Clearly, time-series
variation using national CPI data will not do; any movement in the relative price is perfectly correlated with
the year dummies.  The price must vary must vary over both time and space if g is to be identified.
BLS does not report cross-section data on price levels; SMSA CPI’s (reported for 25 SMSA’s) are
measured only relative to same-city CPI’s in the base year.  Thus, with SMSA specific CPI data we can
calculate relative (measured) inflation rates across cities, but we cannot compare price levels.   So long as
there is sufficient geographic/temporal variation in measured relative inflation rates this may be sufficient to
identify g.  Here I describe the estimation technique employed with the geographic-variation sample; below
I describe the compromises which must be made when we rely on the larger national data base.
Equations (6) and (7) presume data on geographic price variation.  Interpretation of dummy
coefficients is clean and informative:
Equation 8
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Equation 9
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Next assume that the relative bias as between food and nonfood is constant across all years:
Equation 10
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where r is the (unknown) ratio of  ef to en.  The parameter estimates from (7) identify the CPI bias, et, up to


























More generally, Equation (12) is approximately correct so long as either g or (1-r) is close to zero.  If r < 1
as seems plausible (food is less badly biased than nonfood), then (12) understates the bias, increasingly as r
falls increasingly below unity.  Thus we will argue below that (12) gives an approximate lower bound for
the CPI bias.
The SMSA dummy coefficient, given in equation (9), is a weighted average of the SMSA’s base-
period general price level and its relative price of food.  We will discuss interpretation of these coefficients
in the empirical section below.10
d.  Current vs Permanent Income
Ever since Friedman (1957) economists have understood that consumption patterns are best
explained by permanent, not current income. If income is measured with error (either simple measurement
error or failure to properly capture permanency) then the estimate of  b is biased, and (by equation (12)) this
imparts bias to the estimated CPI error
13.
Qualitatively, the concern over permanent income is not a major issue.  Food’s budget share
declined by approximately 25% over the sample period; if little of this decline can be statistically explained
by movements in current income or other regressors, significant bias in the CPI is a very likely candidate for
explaining the movement.  But our estimate of the magnitude of the CPI bias may be estimated with error if
we do not properly capture the effects of permanent income.  
In this section I introduce two sets of regressors which will mitigate the problems associated with
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where yt is income after taxes, deflated by the CPI.
14 I allow the growth coefficients to be different
depending on whether the growth is positive or negative, to address the possibility that consumers respond
differently to a rise than to a fall in income.
With the income-growth variables in the regression, the current-income coefficient relates food’s
share to current income, holding the one-year growth of current income constant.  If these regressors
                                                          
13 The direction of bias, both to b and the ultimate CPI-bias estimate, is unclear, since (mismeasured)
income appears on both sides of the equation.  b is likely biased toward –1 (the elasticity of demand biased
toward 0).  I thank Matthew Shapiro for clarifying this bias discussion.
14 In another specification, not reported, I included two-year lags as well; these were uniformly
insignificant.11
properly complete the relationship between current and permanent income, then we can interpret the
current-income coefficient in the new regression as a permanent-income coefficient.
Second, I replace current CPI-deflated income with the household’s average value of this variable
over the past three years.  I run each specification below respectively with current income and with this
permanent-income measure. I report results for this permanent-income regression only for one specification.
III  DATA
In this section I discuss the formation of my data sets from the PSID panel data set.
a.  Selection Criteria
I begin with the entire 1968-1992 PSID family file, and eliminate cases for a variety of reasons.
The rationale for elimination takes two forms:
·  Good reason to believe that something is wrong with the data;
·  Reason to suspect that the pattern of food demand might be unusual for the excluded category.
Exclusion criteria are as follows:
·  The PSID does not report food consumption for 1973, 1988, or 1989; thus I exclude these years.  I also
exclude 1968-1972 because the food data appear to be unreliable.  PSID for those years reports food at
home, food away from home, and total food.  The first two series do not add up to the third. In
addition, food-at-home’s share of income shows an extraordinarily and implausibly sharp decline from
1968 through 1972, from about 25% of income to about 15%, for whites; and a similar but larger fall
for blacks.









=  cannot be constructed for the most recent year in the PSID.  For this
reason I am unable to use 1992 (except inasmuch as it reports 1991 income).
·  All households with one, or 3 or more, major adults;
·  The poverty sample and all households receiving AFDC or food stamps.
·  Families for whom CPI-deflated family after-tax money income is less than $150, not reported or top-
coded.12
·  Families for whom husband and wife federal income taxes were not reported
·  Families who spent more than 80%, or less than 2%, of income on food
·  Families which reported changes in composition over the previous year.
·  Families for which either the head or wife was less than 21 years old.
b.  Geographic and National Samples
I work with two data sets.  The first is the entire national data set for the PSID, for blacks and
whites (other races are excluded).  The virtue of this data set (relative to the second one, described below) is
size; there are approximately 1800 valid observations per year for whites and just under 100 for blacks.
The second data set includes only observations from SMSA’s for which BLS reports local
Consumer Price Indices.  Tables 1 and 2 gives summary statistics for the 1974 and 1991 components of the
sample respectively, for blacks and for whites, for both samples.
Table 1
 Summary Statistics of Full PSID Sample:
1974 and 1991
WHITE 1974 WHITE 1991 BLACK 1974 BLACK 1991
Number 1450 1901 71 85
“Real” After-tax Income
15 10411 11120 8767 9243
# Children 1.15 1.03 1.32 1.26
County Unemployment 5.51 5.57 4.96 5.37
Husband’s Hrs Work 1984 1902 2012 1841
Wife’s Hrs Work
16 877 1150 1161 1350
Husband’s Education 12.27 13.21 10.04 12.12
Wife’s Education 12.00 13.04 10.77 12.65
Husband’s Age 44.83 45.09 44.45 43.98
Wife’s Age 42.01 42.80 40.22 41.04
Fd Share @ Home .1664 .1204 .2117 .1244
Fd Share Restaurant .025 .031 .024 .031
                                                          
15 “Real” family income is family money income less husband-and-wife federal income taxes, deflated by
the ratio of the current Consumer Price Index to the 1968 CPI.
16 PSID reports wife’s average weekly hours; I have multiplied by 50.13
Table 2
Summary Statistics of Geographic-Variation PSID Sample
1974 and 1991
WHITE 1974 WHITE 1991 BLACK 1974 BLACK 1991
Number 409 403 31 22
“Real” After-tax Income
17 12008 12784 9571 11065
# Children 1.05 .92 1.35 1.13
County Unemployment 6.43 5.59 5.49 6.17
Husband’s Hrs Work 1957 1863 1894 1905
Wife’s Hrs Work
18 855 1044 1280 1512
Husband’s Education 13.07 13.83 10.51 12.79
Wife’s Education 12.27 13.43 11.10 13.04
Husband’s Age 44.10 45.69 42.76 43.83
Wife’s Age 41.68 43.28 38.49 41.54
Food Price
19 1.10 (.015) .972 (.039) 1.10 (.018) .994 (.048)
# SMSA’s 23 25 23 25
Fd Share @ Home .1572 .1196 .2128 .1181
Fd Share Restaurant .027 .030 .030 .033
Unfortunately the second data set is extremely small, particularly for blacks.  The black data set
yields approximately one observation per SMSA per year. I restrict my attention to whites when working
with the smaller geographic-variation sample of Table 2.
IV  RESULTS
a.  Geographic Price Variation
Tables 3 and 4 below give the regression results based on the geographic-variation sample for
whites:
                                                          
17 “Real” family income is family money income less husband-and-wife federal income taxes, deflated by
the ratio of the current CPI to the 1968 CPI.   To convert to 1996 dollars, multiply by 4.51.
18 PSID reports wife’s average weekly hours; I have multiplied by 50.
19 Standard Deviation in parentheses.14
Table 3
Background Coefficients
Whites:  Geographic Sample
  (t-ratios in parentheses)
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic
Constant .980 (29.98)
Age of Head .0008 (4.88)
Age of Wife .0002 (1.36)
# of Children .0212 (32.06)
County Unemp -.00002 (-.059)
Hd ann hrs x10
3 .0064 (6.84)
Wife ann hrs x 10
3 -.0013 (-1.66)
Head education -.00089 (-2.78)
Wife education -.0011 (-3.07)
ln Income -.101 (-53.80)
ln  Rel Food Price .0369 (1.46)
Income Growth + .0022 (1.17)





Time and SMSA Coefficients
Whites:  Geographic Sample
(t-ratios in parentheses)
YEAR COEFFICIENT CUMUL. BIAS
ESTIMATE
SMSA COEFFICIENT P0*
1975 -.0055 (-1.48) .053   (-1.43)
20 New York .0293    (6.588) 1.49
1976 -.0086  (-2.34) .082   (-2.29) Miami .0215      (3.91) 1.38
1977 -.0097  (-2.66) .092   (-2.61) Los Angeles .0183    (3.881) 1.34
1978 -.0142  (-4.00) .131   (-3.94) Buffalo .0182    (1.347) 1.34
1979 -.0169  (-4.71) .154   (-4.65) San Francisco .0178    (1.929) 1.33
1980 -.0218  (-5.51) .194   (-5.43) Portland, OR .0173    (1.61) 1.32
1981 -.0245  (-5.66) .215   (-5.58) Chicago .0134    (2.411) 1.27
1982 -.0241  (-5.15) .212   (-5.08) Cincinnati .0130     (-1.28) 1.27
1983 -.0274  (-5.50) .238   (-5.44) Houston .0117    (1.784) 1.25
1984 -.0277  (-5.63) .240   (-5.56) San Diego .0094    (.690) 1.22
1985 -.0279  (-5.34) .241   (-5.28) Washington, D. C. .0083    (1.127) 1.21
1986 -.0295  (-6.11) .253   (-6.04) Philadelphia .0080    (.997) 1.21
1987 -.0291  (-5.88) .250   (-5.81) Milwaukee .0072    (.219) 1.20
1988 Detroit .0069    (1.049) 1.19
1989 Boston .0063    (.831) 1.19
1990 -.0303  (-6.20) .259   (-6.12) Baltimore .0056    (.876) 1.18
1991 -.0312  (-6.31) .266   (-6.23) Denver .0055    (2.297) 1.18
Pittsburgh .0032    (.446) 1.15
Kansas City .0019    (.472) 1.14
Seattle .0006    (-.724) 1.12
Atlanta 0         (omitted) 1.12
St. Louis -.0020   (-.825) 1.09
Cleveland -.0041   (-1.32) 1.07
Dallas -.0110   (-1.77) 1
Minneapolis St. Paul -.0110   (-2.90) 1
Below I discuss the interpretation of the time dummies, and the income and price coefficients
(which are necessary to map the time dummies into estimates of CPI bias).  Discussion of all other
coefficients is postponed until the end of the empirical section.
i.  Income and Price Coefficients
The income and price coefficients imply approximate income and price elasticities
21 of
respectively +.33 and -.65.  Not surprisingly, given the very small variation in measured relative price of
                                                          
20 T-statistics estimated for et as follows:  First run equation (7) via OLS.  Solve for et as described above.
With these estimated coefficients as initial points, run equation (6) via NLLS (with (ef - en) suppressed,
incorporating the maintained hypothesis that r = 1).  SPSS generates point estimates and standard errors for
et.
21 Formulas for income and price elasticities are respectively16
food, the price coefficient is not estimated precisely.  And the implied price elasticity seems high.  In work
below, when I need an assumed value for g, I will assume alternatively the .037 point estimate from table 3
and .07; the latter implies a price elasticity of approximately .45.
22
To some readers, the income elasticity looks low; it is much lower, for example, than that
estimated by Tobin (1950). 
23 Two points are in order:  First, in that specification below in which I report
results based on a 3-year average of income, the elasticity rises to about 0.4.  Second, my estimated
elasticity is for food at home, which is demanded more inelastically than total food.
24
ii.  Interpretation of Year Coefficients
If the assumptions underlying equation (11) are satisfied, then the cumulative CPI bias for each
year is found by dividing the year coefficient by the income coefficient.  The estimated cumulative percent














Annual bias is easily found by taking the difference between successive cumulative bias estimates.
Figure 3 gives point estimates for cumulative bias, from 1975 through 1991.  In most but not all cases  the
difference between successive-year dummy coefficients is significant.  Generally two-year differences are
significant. The figure tells a striking story:  The average annual bias from 1974 through 1981 is 3.54%; for














where a is the share of the food price in the cost of living index.
22 The income coefficient is fairly close to that of Deaton and Muellbauer (1980), but the price coefficient is
substantially lower than theirs.
23 I thank Matthew Shapiro for bringing Tobin’s paper to my attention, and for sharpening my own
approach to permanent income.
24 If 20% of food is at restaurants (about right for 1991), and restaurant-food demand is unit elastic, the
overall elasticity of demand for food rises from 0.4 to 0.52 (or from 0.33 to 0.36).17
the period 1982-1991, average annual bias is 0.67%.
25  If these estimates are even close to correct, the
productivity slowdown of the 1970s is a chimera.
Recall that this estimate is valid only up to the unknown value of r, the ratio of the bias in food to
nonfood.  If food is less badly biased than nonfood, equation (14) understates the CPI bias.
iii.  A Caveat:  The Relative CPI of Food
The relative CPI of food fell by about 13% from 1975 through 1985, and then rose by about 3% to
1990.  By itself, this accounts for a decline in food’s share from 1975 to 1985, and a rise thereafter.  In
principle, this price movement has been accounted for by the inclusion of the relative CPI of food in the
regression.  But if the price coefficient is biased, then so is the portion of temporal movement in food’s
share which the regression  attributes to intertemporal movements in the price of food.  Thus the portion left
to be explained by CPI bias is also biased.
If the true value of g is higher than the estimated value of .0369, then part of the decline in food’s
share from 1975 through 1985 which we attribute to CPI bias is really due to the decline in the measured
price of food,  and our estimate of CPI bias for this period is biased upward.  By contrast, our estimate of
bias since 1985 is biased downward.  The second series in Figure 3 shows cumulative bias under the
alternative assumption that g = .07. As can be seen, the effect is quite modest, and the overall story is
essentially unchanged:  annual bias is around 3% from 1975 through 1981 and just under 1% since.
                                                          
25 The diminution of bias after 1981 appears in all specifications and for both blacks and whites.  I will
discuss possible reasons for this diminution at the end of the empirical section.18
Figure 3
b.  The National Sample:  No Price-Variation Data
The limited size of the geographic sample, dictated by the limited coverage of local CPI deflators,
precludes four important lines of inquiry regarding Engel curves and their implications for CPI bias:
·  Functional form:  Perhaps the true relationship between food’s share and log income is nonlinear; if so
it is possible that the series of year dummies is really picking up unmeasured nonlinearity rather than
unmeasured inflation.  As we will see, the estimating equation required to explore this question requires
several hundred dummy variables under the geographic-variation regime.
·  Race:  I wish to explore the possibility that CPI bias is different for blacks than for whites.  My basic
hypothesis (confirmed below) is that the true cost of living has grown more slowly for blacks than for
whites over the sample period, reflecting a gradual erosion in general price discrimination against
blacks.  This issue cannot be meaningfully explored with the geographic sample, because (see Table 2)
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·  Age:  Many people are concerned about the possibility that the true cost of living grows at a different
rate for the elderly than the prime-aged population.  With a sufficient sample size (i.e., the national
sample) I can simply estimate Engel-curve equation separately for the prime-age population and the
over-62 population.  I have carried out this exercise but to not report the results.  There is no material
difference between the estimated inflation rates for prime-age and old people.
·  Fixed effects: If any omitted household-specific fixed effects are correlated with the regressors, then
OLS regression coefficients are biased.  As is well known, fixed-effect biases are eliminated by taking
first differences.  Given the importance of income growth, we need three successive years of data on a
household (rather than the usual two) in order to construct an observation.  Particularly in light of my
selection criterion requiring no change in family composition, this substantially reduces the number of
observations.  In order to retain an adequate sample size, I elected to estimate the first-difference
version of equation (7) only with the white subset of the national sample .  In fact, both the background
coefficients and the year dummies were virtually identical to the OLS coefficients, so I do not report
fixed-effects results.
To explore these questions I use the entire PSID sample (subject to the criteria described above),
and estimate equation (7) and appropriate variants,  omitting the relative price term and the SMSA
dummies.  I refer to equation (7) but without the price term or the SMSA dummies as equation (7a).
i.  Basics
The form without the food price or the SMSA dummies is misspecified.  A simple if inelegant test
of  the importance of specification bias is to run equation (7a) – the one without price and SMSA dummies
– over the geographic sample, and to compare the results with those of equation (7).  When I do this
26, the
adjusted R
2 falls from .538 to .501.  Both the background and time-dummy coefficients (corrected for
omission of time-series variation in the relative measured price of food, see below)  are very close to the
equation-(7) specifications.  
By omitting the food-price term from (7a) , we eliminate not only cross-section variation in the
relative price of food, but time-series variation as well. The year dummy coefficients pick up not only the
CPI bias of equation (8) but also the effect of intertemporal variation in the relative (CPI-measured, but20
omitted because of perfect correlation with the year dummies) price of food.  Proper interpretation of the
year dummy coefficient is given by equations (15) and (16).  CPI bias is found by subtracting g(pf,t - pn,t)
from the dummy coefficient, and then dividing by b (assuming, as discussed above, that g(1-r) is close to
zero).    As the relative CPI of food declined by about 10% from 1974 through 1991, part of the decline in
wf is due to the (measured) food-price decline and not to any unmeasured rise in income
Equation 15
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ii.  Log Linear Results by Race
There is a substantial literature suggesting that blacks’ economic difficulties extend beyond their
inability to earn income at the same rate as whites.  Unfortunately, there is no systematic evidence on the
magnitude of this discrimination, nor what has happened to this magnitude over the past two decades.  In
this section I hope to fill this void.
The most obvious “direct” method of estimating the cost-of-living premium faced by blacks would
be to reproduce BLS’s CPI analysis separately for blacks.  Even at a point in time the task would be
enormous; there is no hope of using this approach to track any trend in price discrimination.  And even if it
could be done up to BLS’s standards, it would still suffer from CPI bias.
The approach developed above is much more parsimonious; it infers movement in the true cost of
living based on food consumption.  With adequate data, this method can isolate inter-racial differences in
the growth rate of the cost of living.  To do this, I estimate equation (7a) separately for blacks and whites.
27
                                                                                                                                                                            
26 These results are not shown, but are available on request.
27 As noted above, the geographic-variation sample has far too few black observations (approximately one
per city per year).21
Table 5 gives the estimated coefficients for the two races, as well as a separate set of results for whites, in
which current CPI-deflated income is replaced by its (past) three-year average.
                      Table 5
Regression Coefficients by Race
    Equation 7a:  National Sample
               (t-ratios in parentheses)
WHITES WHITES
3 YR AVG INC
BLACKS
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT COEFFICIENT COEFFICIENT
Constant .997    (123.68) .906      (128.78) 1.028   (23.41)
Age of Head .0005  (5.67) .00023  (6.46) .0007   (1.86)
Age of Wife .0002  (2.44) .00068  (20.95) -.0001  (-0.25)
# of Children .020    (54.75) .022      (56.83) .016     (9.01)
County  Unemp .0004   (3.07) .00051  (3.61) .0013   (1.55)
Head ann hrs x10
3 .0052   (10.58) .003      (5.23) .0034   (1.20)
Wife ann hrs x10
3 -.0017    (-4.08) -.0035   (-3.10) -.0054  (-2.12)
Head education -.00004  (-.22) -.0014   (-9.54) .0016   (1.99)
Wife education -.0013    (-6.24) .00084   (6.04) -.0054  (-4.97)
Ln Income -.097    (-101.84) -.089      (-106.8) -.096    (-16.88)
Inc Growth + .0014   (1.60) -.026      (-15.8) -.010    (-1.10)
Inc Growth - -.056      (-28.30) -.125      (-65.45) -.082    (-7.49)
Fdshare-out .067        (5.26) .043        (4.14) .060     (.798)
1975 -.00561  (-2.57) -.00404   (-1.88) .0147    (1.13)
1976 -.00668  (-3.10) -.00802   (-3.78) -.0141   (-1.12)
1977 -.00951  (-4.48) -.0121     (-5.780 -.0118   (-0.960)
1978 -.0118    (-5.60) -.0137     (-6.60) .0018    (0.149)
1979 -.0131    (-6.27) -.0156     (-7.59) -.0116   (-.948)
1980 -.0210    (-10.07) -.0235     (-11.45) -.0238   (-1.95)
1981 -.0217    (-10.02) -.0235     (-11.02) -.0299   (-2.32)
1982 -.0260    (-11.93) -.0297     (-13.80) -.0415   (-3.20)
1983 -.0246    (-11.15) -.0289     (-13.22) -.0397   (-3.04)
1984 -.0291    (-13.63) -.0345     (-16.27) -.0432   (-3.33)
1985 -.0297    (-13.78) -.0334     (-15.57) -.0526   (-4.07)
1986 -.0306    (-14.61) -.0327     (-15.71) -.0534   (-4.18)
1987 -.0316    (-15.39) -.0359     (-17.84) -.0559   (-4.50)
1990 -.0356    (-17.14) -.0380     (-18.87) -.0627   (-5.00)
1991 -.0374    (-18.27) -.0409     (-20.60) -.0596   (-4.82)
Adj R
2 .504 .475 .512
First, note the estimates based respectively on current and 3-year average (CPI-deflated) income
respectively, for whites.  With three-year average income, the income elasticity rises from about .33 to
about .4 as would be expected.  Most of the background coefficients show little change.  The estimated
dummy coefficients are somewhat larger and the estimated CPI biases are also a bit higher.  (Cumulative
estimated CPI bias from 1974 through 1991 is 19% greater under the 3-year-average than under the current-22
income specification.)  The fit is somewhat worse under the 3-year-average specification; on this criterion I
discuss only the results based on current income.
Figure 4 shows estimated cumulative CPI bias respectively for whites and blacks, calculated
according to equation (14) (assuming g = .0369 as estimated in table 3).  Average annual bias for whites is
2.75% from 1974-1981 and 1.51% thereafter; for blacks it is 4% from 1974-1981 and 2.99% thereafter.
Over the complete sample period the black cost of living premium over whites has declined by 14
percentage points.
 Figure 4
King and Mieszkowski (1971) find about a 10% black housing-price premium in New Haven.
Kain and Quigley (1970) find only about a 5% premium in St. Louis.  In a careful survey of grocery price
discrimination, Sexton (1971) reports that the collective wisdom of the studies is inconclusive.  There was
generally no evidence of a ghetto price premium holding constant the type of store (i.e., chain, large
independent, small independent).  However, prices at chains were lower than at independents (particularly
small independents) and chains were disproportionately located outside the ghetto.
In neither housing nor food is there independent evidence of the roughly 14% black premium in
the early 1970s that is implied by my findings, though in both the grocery and housing literature there is
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(inconclusive) evidence of somewhat smaller price discrimination.  Both sets of studies were subject to
substantial criticism at the time of their publication.  As it seems impossible to refine these studies after a
lapse of 25 years, or to extend them to other goods, one is left to decide whether my own indirect evidence
is sufficient to support the conclusion of an approximate 14-percentage-point decline in price discrimination
against blacks since 1974.
The finding of a dramatic difference in apparent CPI bias by race  does not demonstrate that the
level of pure race-based price discrimination is declining, or that it was high in the late 1970s.  One
possibility is that, whereas blacks did face higher prices in the 1970s than whites, the cause was not race per
se but something correlated with race.  I explore two such possibilities below.
·  The effect of migration:  King and Mieszkowski found that black families who had recently migrated to
the current urban area generally faced higher housing costs than otherwise similar families.  It is
plausible that recent migrants face a higher cost of living in general than natives, because it takes time
to acquire the knowledge to shop efficiently.  To explore this possibility I have re-run the regression of
Table 5 with two added regressors (entered both separately and jointly).  The first is a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the household lived in a different state last year; the second is a dummy equal to 1 if the
household lived in a different county last year.  For both blacks and whites, both of these variables are
insignificant and have essentially no effect on the other coefficients.
·  Central-city costs:  Living costs are generally higher in central cities than suburbs or outside SMSA’s,
for reasons that will be discussed when I examine the SMSA dummy coefficients below.  Perhaps
blacks’ gain on whites in terms of cost of living is not due to eroding racial price barriers per se, but to
the increasing ability of blacks to move to the suburbs, where prices are lower for all. To test for this, I
have re-run the regression underlying Table 5, for both blacks and whites, including a dummy variable
equal to 1 if the household lives in an SMSA central city and another dummy if it lives in an SMSA
suburb (thus living outside an SMSA is the excluded group).  For both races, food’s share is about 1.5
points higher in SMSA’s than out of SMSA’s, but there is no significant difference between city and
suburb, and the other coefficients were unaffected.24
b.  Functional Form
The estimating equations, (7) and (7a), presume that wf  is linear in the log of real income.  But if
the true relationship is nonlinear,
28 the year dummy coefficients in (7) is in part picking up unmeasured
nonlinearity in the relationship between the wf and income rather than unmeasured growth in income. 
29
Even if the true demand function is quite nonlinear in income, it is unlikely that such nonlinearity
gives rise to much of the estimated drift in the Engel curves reported above, as can be seen in Figure 5.
This figure plots the Engel curves for whites, based on the coefficients from Table 5
30  for 1974 and 1991.
The Engel-curve drift apparent in this graph is what I attribute to CPI bias.  Functional-form bias might
arise if most of the 1974 observations come from the left portion of that fitted curve and the 1991
observations come disproprortionately from the right portion.  Then one could imagine that there is but one
“true” Engel curve, which the regression failed to find because of the imposed log-linearity.
The data-point configuration envisioned above does not occur.  The heavy marker-free portions of
the two Engel curves in figure 5 depict the sample (within-year) mean plus and minus one standard-
deviation.  Since the observations do not come from different levels of CPI-deflated income, it is unlikely
that unmeasured nonlinearity accounts for the time dummies (i.e., for the drift in estimated Engel curves).
                                                          
28 Indeed, since a budget share is are bounded between 0 and 1, it cannot be linear in log income as income
grows without limit.
29 Several authors have found higher-order terms in log income to be significant.
30 Calculated at sample average values of the regressors other than income and the year dummies25
Figure 5
 I have checked for nonlinearity by exploring various functional forms within a given year.
31  By
restricting my “fishing” to a single year (I chose 1976) I eliminate CPI-bias induced mismeasurement of
income; thus any nonlinearity that I find (or do not find) is due to true variation in income.  Among the
forms attempted, I obtained the best fit with
Equation 17
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As a further check I ran equation (17) separately for each year.  For both races the quadratic fit the
data better than the linear equation, with adjusted R
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all of the coefficients including income and income squared were quite similar across years.  For blacks, all
of the coefficients except income and income squared were stable across years.  However, the income and
income squared coefficients were very unstable, likely reflecting the fact that there were relatively few very
high black family incomes.   Inasmuch as the income coefficients for blacks and whites were quite similar to
one another in the prior specification, in the quadratic specification below I assume that the black and white
income coefficients are identical; however, I allow all of the other coefficients to vary by race.
The next task with the nonlinear form is to incorporate the errors-in-variables hypotheses
concerning the CPI, as represented in equations (4) and  (5).  Making these substitutions and collecting
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The square-bracketed terms at the end of the lines indicate the dummy-variable configurations that
in principle would capture each of the error contributions.  Unfortunately, this specification yields 509
dummy variables (17 time dummies, 17 time dummies interacted with income, 25 city dummies,  25  city
dummies interacted with income, and 425 city-time cross dummies).  I did not attempt to estimate this
equation over the geographic sample, with the price variable and the SMSA dummies included.
I estimate the quadratic form only with the national sample, thus gaining observations and
shedding variables (the relative price of food and the SMSA dummies).  In addition, I impose more
structure on the time path of CPI bias.  In place of a completely free set of year dummies I assume that the
cumulative bias for each component of the CPI grows piecewise linearly:
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Under this form the annual (incremental) bias is equal to e0 from  1974 through 1980, and is equal to
e e 00 + $ thereafter.  This specification allows for the deceleration of bias after 1980 that appeared in Table
4 and Figure 3.
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where B = 1 if the household is black.  Thus coefficients subscripted by a B represent the differential effect
of the variables on blacks.
The time dummies, both free-standing and interacted, have been replaced by a simple time trend.
Interpretation of the time coefficients is given below:
32
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where() ,, p p ft n t -  is the average rate of CPI-measured relative food price drift over the sample period.
The coefficient r2 enables us to identify e0, the average annual rate of CPI bias.  And borrowing
our estimate of the price coefficient g from Table 3, we can identify (ef0 - en0), the annual bias in the relative
price of food.  Note that with the nonlinear form we do not need an estimate of g to identify the overall CPI
bias, e0.
Table 6 reports OLS estimation results for equation 20:
Table 6
     Regression Results from Equation 20
   WHITES    BLACKS
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT T-STAT DUMMY
COEFFICIENT
T STAT
Const 4.643 56.37 .066 3.76
Husband Age .00036 4.17 -.00024 -0.77
Wife Age .00012 1.30 -.000007 -0.20
# Children .020 56.50 -.0041 -2.86
Husb Education -.00008 -0.51 .0006 1.04
Wife Education -.0013 -6.61 -.0032 -3.78
Unemp .00056 4.37 .00076 1.23
Husb Hrs .005 10.45 -.0027 -1.21
Wife Hrs -.0026 -6.57 -.0030 -1.49
Ygrow -.000006 -0.69 -.014 -1.90
Yshrink -.045 -22.84 -.022 -2.67
Fdshare-out .061 5.32 -.0003 -0.87
b1 -.888 -49.76
b2 .043 43.69
time×ln(atyr) (r2) .00215 4.97 .00250 2.66
time  (r1) -.0230 -5.79 -.025 -2.90
)
r1 .0138 2.55 -.0079 -0.50
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The second line of (21) yields point estimates of e0 and  0 ˆ e .  Point estimates are given in Table 7
above.  The results are broadly consistent with all of our prior CPI bias estimates.  For whites the bias fell
from about 2.5% per year in 1974-1980 to 1% thereafter.  The annual bias for blacks is 3 points higher than
whites throughout the time period, about twice the gap estimated in the log-linear forms. For whites, food
is biased about a half-point more badly than nonfood; for blacks the opposite is true.
c.   Diminishing Bias
Across all specifications, and for both blacks and whites, the results suggest that the average bias
was at least one point lower after 1981 than before.
33  Two explanations suggest themselves.  First,  Baily
(1981) has shown that there was much more relative price volatility in the 1970s than in the 1960s.  If
                                                          
3333 However, the deceleration for blacks is not statistically significant; see the t-statistic for   2 ˆ r  for blacks
in table 6.30
relative price volatility diminished in the 1980s with the decline in overall inflation, then it is likely that
substitution bias in the CPI also declined.
A substantial part of the explanation surely also lies with technical progress at BLS.
34  Perhaps the
most significant was the 1983 modification of the homeowner component of the housing cost index.
IV.  BACKGROUND COEFFICIENTS
In the above regressions, I have included a series of background regressors, some of which are of
considerable interest in their own right.  With the exception of the SMSA dummies, which appear only in
the smaller geographic sample, the same background regressors appear in all equations; as their coefficients
are similar across these equations, I restrict my discussion to their values in the final regression.
a.  The SMSA Coefficients
The SMSA dummy coefficient’s interpretation is given by equation (9) and reported in Table 4.
We can only extract SMSA-specific estimates of p0 from these estimates after making some assumptions
concerning the relationship between p0f and p0n.  Two natural assumptions concerning geographic variation
in the prices of food and nonfood present themselves:
i      Food is transportable; it is sold on a national market and commands the same price everywhere
35;
ii.   Geographic price differences occur equally across commodities; the relative price of food and nonfood
is the same across SMSA’s.
Under either assumption we can use equation (9) to convert SMSA dummies into cost-of-living
indices.  The calculated CPI bias based on assumption (ii) is presented in the last column of Table 4. Under
this more conservative
36 assumption (only the price of nonfood varies across SMSA’s), the most expensive
SMSA (New York) is 49% more expensive than the least expensive cities (Dallas and Minneapolis).
The pattern of SMSA cost-of-living variation is amazingly reasonable.  Standard urban models tell
us that the cost of living rises with city size, and that money incomes should vary in the same proportion to
compensate for inter-SMSA cost of living differences.  Qualitatively, then, we expect to see food’s share of
income higher, correcting for money income, in big cities than small.
                                                          
34 Greenlees and Mason (1996) provide a tabular history of technical improvements in the CPI.
35 This is the assumption of standard urban models.
36 Under assumption (ii) calculated interurban cost of living differences are about 40% smaller than under
assumption (i).31
A simple regression of my calculated SMSA cost of living on SMSA population yields the
following result:
Equation 22
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The cost of living rises 1.70% per million population.  Independent evidence on the effect of city
size on cost of living is sketchy, but consistent with this estimate.  In an admittedly back-of-the-envelope
calculation based on a simple urban model and reasonable assumptions regarding commuting cost and other
parameter values, Mills and Hamilton (1994) calculate that the cost of living rises by approximately 1.5%
per million residents.  Rosen’s (1979) interurban wage regressions indicate that a 10% population increase
leads to approximately a 0.5% increase in hourly wages,  presumably  to compensate for a cost of living
increase.  A population increase from 3 million to 4 million (i.e., 30%) thus leads to a 1.5% increase in
wages.  The equation-22 coefficient of 1.70% is very much in line with this other evidence.  The pattern of
SMSA dummy coefficients above is both qualitatively and quantitatively consistent with the urban models;
recipients of these high wages do not act rich (i.e., do not spend a low fraction of their incomes on food);
they act like consumers whose high wages are offset by high prices.
The ability of the Engel-curve approach to identify inter-urban cost of living differences gives
some reason to believe that estimates of year-to-year cost of living differences might be accurately
estimated by the same approach.
b.  Education
For both races (Table 6), husband’s education has a small and insignificant effect on food
consumption.  For wives, particularly black wives, the effect is large and significant.  A 4-year rise in a
white wife’s education reduces food’s share by 0.52 points, about the same as a 5% rise in income.  A
similar rise in a black wife’s education reduces food’s share by 1.8 points, the same effect as is generated by
an 18% rise in income.
One possible explanation for this finding is that a rise in female education shifts family preferences
away from food; another is that the rise in education shifts intra-family bargaining power toward wives, and32
that they respond by reducing food expenditure.  But these arguments would seem to lead in the opposite
direction; an increase in female education should lead the family to devote more resources to food. 
37
There is a third explanation, consistent with the hypothesis of this paper; a rise in female education
reduces the cost of living.  According to this explanation, food’s share falls with female education because
real income rises.   More educated females shop more efficiently, or to put it differently more educated
females run more efficient household-production technologies.  According to this hypothesis, a 4-year rise
in female education enables a white household to get about 5% more out of its expenditure dollars and a
black family about 18% more.  If this interpretation is correct, the rate of return to black female education is
approximately 9%, counting only the reduced-cost-of-living effect.
38  But of course some or all of this effect
might be a return to (unobserved) ability, omitted but correlated with education.
c.  Dynamics
Table 8 below illustrates the dynamics of food consumption as income changes.  First, I calculate
food consumption (in dollars) at new steady-state income = $11,000 (in 1968 dollars) and at  the sample
means of all of the other regressors, setting both income-growth variables equal to zero (this gives steady-
state value of wf, which I solve for food consumption).  Then I simulate respectively a 10% rise in income
(to the new steady state) and a 10% decline in income (to the same new steady state).
                                                          
37 Recall that the wife’s hours of work are included in the regression; the income coefficient is not proxying
for hours.
38 The calculation is done as follows:  normalize husband’s and wife’s earnings to 1 (each).  Let the cost of
a year of education be 1 (i.e., a year of the wife’s income foregone).  Four years of education costs 4 and
reduces food’s share by 1.8 points, which implies a rise in family income of 18%.  Since income = 2, the
rise in income is .36.  The rate of return is .36/4 = 9%.33
Table 8
Food-Consumption Response
   to 10% Income Change
WHITES
COL. # 1 2 3 4
 INCOME RISES  INCOME FALLS
FOOD INCOME FOOD INCOME
Old Steady State 1354 10000 1441 12220
Transition 1395 11000 1440 11000
New Steady State 1395 11000 1395 11000
Reading down Columns 1 and 2, income was originally $10,000 and food consumption was $1354.
In row 2 income jumps 10% (to $11,000); food consumption immediately rises to $1395.  Row 3 reveals
that the new steady state food consumption is $1395.  When income rises consumers immediately jump to
the new steady state, apparently regarding the income increase as permanent.  By contrast, when income
falls in Columns 3 and 4 (from $12,220 to $11,000) white consumers make no adjustment in the first year;
they appear to regard a fall in income as completely transitory.
The behavior of blacks is quite different, as is revealed in Table 8a below:
Table 8a
Food-Consumption Response
   to 10% Income Change
BLACKS
COL # 1 2 3 4
INCOME RISES INCOME FALLS
FOOD INCOME FOOD INCOME
Old Steady State 1722 9000 1891 11111
Transition 1788 10000 1870 10000
New Steady State 1803 10000 1803 10000
When blacks’ incomes rise, the first-year response is only about 80% of the steady state; when
income falls they immediately close about 25% of the steady-state gap.  Whereas whites treat a rise in
income as permanent and a fall as so temporary as to be ignored, blacks take a fall in income more seriously
and give less credence to a rise.34
d.   Eating Out
If home-cooked and restaurant meals are perfect substitutes then the dependent variable should be the
budget share of total food; otherwise the relative price of restaurant meals should enter on the right-hand
side.  Unfortunately neither restaurant food expenditure nor its price seems to be available in high-quality
form.  The former is reported by the PSID but only in fairly broad bands and many zero entries, and the
latter has the same problems as the food CPI discussed above.  I have approached the problem in two ways.
First, despite data-quality concerns I ran the regressions of Table 6 above with total food’s share as the
dependent variable.  None of the point estimates was materially affected, but the fit was considerably worse.
39 I do not report these results.  Second, as can be seen, I added the budget share of food away from home as
a right-hand side regressor.  Inclusion has no material effect on other coefficients.  The coefficient is always
small and positive (!), and significant.
It is implausible that home-cooked and restaurant meals are complements as implied by the coefficient;
perhaps the restaurant variable is picking up a fixed gourmand effect.  In any event the effect is very small;
a 1-point rise in restaurant-food’s share increases home-food’s share by 0.06 points.
V  CONCLUSION
In this paper I estimate Engel curves for black and white households in the PSID.  If the Engel
curves are properly specified, and if there are no systematic errors in the data, the coefficients of these
curves should not move from year to year.  By observing the annual drift in these estimated Engel curves, I
am able to infer the rate of bias in the CPI, which was used to deflate the income variable.
For all of the above specifications, we find evidence of substantial CPI bias, which is generally
much more severe during the 1970s than later, and for blacks than whites.  Table 9 pulls together the
annual-bias estimates from all of the various functional forms and data sets:
                                                          
39 As predicted, the income elasticity rises somewhat (b falls); this is almost exactly offset by declines in the
time dummy coefficients, leaving the estimated CPI bias virtually unchanged.35
Table 9
























-.0251 -.0093 -.0542 -.038436
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Appendix:  Cost Functions
e.  Within-Group Prices, Weights, and Substitution
The debate over CPI bias properly centers on the question of the accuracy of individual-good
prices, their weights in a correct index, and the degree of substitutability among goods as their relative
prices change.  In my approach, none of these things is observed, except as they are borrowed from the CPI
itself.  And even when I borrow, the only use I make of CPI data is to estimate the price coefficient.
40  In
this section I ask specifically how these crucial components of a cost of living index (prices, weights, and
substitutability) manifest themselves in my method, and by extension what assumptions we must adopt in
order to place credence in the method.
Clearly, “food” and “nonfood” are not individual goods but aggregates, and therefore, “pf” and
“pn” are not prices but price indices.  In order to write a demand function in the form of Equation (1), I must
assume:
i.  food and nonfood are additively separable in the utility function, and
ii.  subutilities for food and nonfood are both homothetic.
Homotheticity is required so that food (and nonfood) can meaningfully be decomposed into a price
index and a quantity index.; without homotheticity this decomposition changes with utility.  To see the role
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where z’s are individual goods and r’s are their prices.  If preferences are homothetic, the solution can be
written as
Equation 14
() m i n i i f u h z r r r ,..., ) ( 1 × =
                                                          
40 I deflate money incomes by the CPI, but this is only for convenience.  If I left incomes undeflated, my
year dummy coefficients would be my estimate of the movement in the true cost of living index, rather than
the movement of this index less the CPI.39
Now without loss of generality let subutility be homogeneous of degree 1 (not just homothetic):
Equation 15
Þ = = n u u h n n) (
åå = = =
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where cn(p,1) is the consumer’s expenditure function (for nonfood) evaluated at un = 1.
With this normalization we can treat utility itself as the quantity index, and expenditure decomposes:
Equation 16
n P x n n × =
That is, total expenditure on nonfood can be decomposed into a price index Pn and a utility or “quantity”
index.  (And of course the same is true for food.)  This verifies that under homotheticity within food and
nonfood, and additivity between food and nonfood, the form of equation (1) is correct.  Next I show how it
is possible to infer a great deal about movements in P (the true cost of living) without knowing the values of
the individual prices or the form of f(r1,…,rm).  Let us suppose that some price in Pn, call it rn1, declined
(but that the decline was either not observed or not properly interpreted by BLS).   The effect of this change























































































































The first term in the second line of (17) (and repeated in equation (18), {·}, is the change in the
true cost of living brought about by our hypothetical Dr.  Next, aggregate the effects of all of the price




















































































The change in the true cost of living brought about by all of these price changes is
Equation 20
å å





















































In essentially all CPI research, the strategy is to first (attempt to) observe all of the Dr’s and then
to make an assumption about (d ln P)/(d ln r).  In a fixed-weight index the derivative is simply given by the
individual goods’ budget shares; if substitution is allowed for, some modification is required based on
demand parameters.
Systematic direct observation of the components of {·} is extraordinarily difficult; hence the lively
debate over bias in the CPI.  My approach rests on the proposition that it is much easier to observe the other
components of equation (19), and that we can use this insight to solve directly for DlnP rather than estimate
it piece by piece.
If one is willing to make an assumption about the relative importance of unobserved price changes
as between food and nonfood (an assumption on the value of r, see equqations 10 and 11), then with data on
food’s budget share, and the demand parameters b and g, one can infer movements in the true cost of living41
without recourse to direct data on within-group prices, budget shares, or substitution elasticities.  These
prices, budget shares and substitution elasticities will manifest themselves in food’s share directly.
Unless one has faith in the identification by functional form implicit in the nonlinear specification of
Equation (24) and the identification of bias from Equation (27), this is as far as we can go; the level of bias
is identified, regardless of the source of bias (missing price change or failure to account for substitution), up
to an assumed value of r, the unknown ratio of bias in food and nonfood.